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The majority of the consuming public today, whether consciously
or subconsciously, purchases goods by means of symbols.I These sym-
bols include not only brand names, labels and distinctive coloring, but
also the shape of the product's package or container.
2
The significant role that packages and containers play in today's
market seems to be a function of the relationship between television
and other advertising media and the supermarket and similar self-serv-
ice stores. 3 As the consumer is inundated with more elaborate and cre-
ative displays of merchandise, the resulting effect is to purchase by
sight.4 In such a setting, the consumer confronts the package instead of
the salesman.5
Often, the merchandise being purchased is neither so specialized
and distinctive nor so complex as to require the scrutiny of a sophisti-
* © Copyright 1982 by Gary Schuman. All Rights Reserved.
SB.A. (cum laude) Alfred University (1971); J.D. University of Notre Dame (1974); mem-
ber of the New York and Illinois bars. Mr. Schuman is associated with the firm of Defrees &
Fiske, Chicago, Illinois.
1. As the Supreme Court stated in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942):
The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of
symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by
them .... The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort
to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol....
2. "[P]ackaging...represents a sales technique designed to make the product readily identi-
fiable to consumers and unique in the marketplace." Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy
Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831 (1 1th Cir. 1982). See, e.g., Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q.
229 (Dec. Comm. Pats. 1958); Moy, Jr., Lanham Act Registration of Container or Product Shape as
a Trademark, 60 TRADE-MARK REP. 71, 72 (1970); Masloski, Packaging: An Important Element In
Advertising, Crain's Chicago Business, July 26, 1982, at 72.
3. See Fremont Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 415, 418, 421-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distributors, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 471, 476-77 (D.P.R.
1981), afl'd, 687 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982). See also Marks, 'Dressing'A Trademark to Project a
Modern Image Requires Careful 'Tailoring,' 66 TRADE-MARK REP. 12, 13 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as "Marks"]; Lunsford, Jr., The Protection ofPackages and Containers, 56 TRADE-MARK REP. 567
(1966) [hereinafter cited as "Lunsford"].
4. Lunsford, supra note 3.
5. "Packaging is often vitally more important to customers than the contents of the pack-
age." OXENFELDT, EXECUTIVE ACTION IN MARKETING 345 (1966).
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cated buyer.6 The package or container becomes both a salesman and
an advertisement on the shelf by attracting attention, describing the
product's features, looking convenient, making a favorable overall im-
pression and giving the consumer confidence that he is purchasing the
same product that had satisfied him previously. 7 A distinct and appeal-
ing visual identity for a product has thus become a highly prized goal
in today's commercial marketplace. Simply stated, those products that
stand out sell first.8 A manufacturer which markets dishwashing deter-
gent or cleansers, for example, must differentiate its product from simi-
lar products scattered among thousands of feet of shelf space.9 The
merchandising goal is to design a package or container configuration
that will be successful in not only attracting purchases but also in creat-
ing a consumer recognition symbol.' 0
To meet these marketing needs, companies have expended and
continue to expend large amounts of money for research, development
and advertising to establish a substantial market for their product," l
which the consuming public identifies by its familiar package or
container shape.' 2 These expenditures and marketing techniques man-
date that free competition (the ability to copy package and container
configurations)' 3 be subordinated to the interest of the honest business-
man and of the public in not being deceived as to the source of the
product. '4
6. Purolator 524 F. Supp. at 477. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Quality Pure, 207
U.S.P.Q. 1127 (D.N.J. 1979), wherein plaintiffsought to protect its trade dress, including the shape
of its bottle, for skin oil and shampoo.
7. Marks, supra note 3 at 14.
8. See Fremont Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(it is the custom in the frozen food business for each manufacturer to establish an identity in
packing design for its own line of products). See also Masloski, Packaging. An Important Element
in Advertising, Crain's Chicago Business, July 26, 1982, at 72.
9. Marks, supra note 3 at 14.
10. See Johnson & Johnson v. Quality Pure, 207 U.S.P.Q. 1127 (D.N.J. 1979); Freemont Co.
v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
11. Note, The Protectability of Package, Container and Product Configurations, 5 U.S.F.L.
REV. 451, 454 (1971); How Well Will it Sell? MODERN PACKAGING 101 (Feb. 1970); Gamboni,
Unfair Competition Protection After Sears and Compco, 55 TRADE-MARK REP. 964, 975 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as "Gamboni"].
12. Gamboni, supra note I I at 976.
13. Note, The Public Interest and the Right to Copy Non-Functional Product Features, 19 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 317 (1977-78) (hereinafter cited as "Public Interest"); Note, Unfair Competition
and the Doctrine of Functionality, 1964 COLUM. L. REV. 544, 549.
14. Public Interest, supra note 13. As the legislative history of the Lanham Act states:
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a
choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the
other. Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer
the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates. To protect trade-marks,
therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to
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It is unfair competition to represent one's product in such a man-
ner that consumers are induced to believe that the merchandise they
are buying is that of one producer when it is actually the merchandise
of a competitor who has copied the packaging of its rival.' 5 Equity
demands that the businessman's investment of time, money and effort
in developing his distinctive package or container be protected against
imitation by a competitor calculated to deceive the public and capital-
ize upon the labors of the competitor.16
This article discusses the foundations of trademark protection af-
forded to package and container configurations. After exploring the
likelihood of confusion test, the basic premise of trademark protection,
the article will demonstrate that the 1964 Sears and Compco 17 deci-
sions, which were once thought to have changed over 100 years of legal
protection of designs, have had little or no effect on the protection of
package and container shapes. Finally, the article will discuss the cir-
cumstances under which package and container configurations may ob-
tain trademark protections and what rights those protections entail.
BACKGROUND AND THE BASIC PREMISE-THE LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION TEST
The essential issue in trademark infringement actions (both statu-
tory and at common law) is whether the purchasers are likely to be
misled or confused as to the source of different products.' 8 This issue
remains the same, whether the court's focus is on trademark infringe-
ment or unfair competition. 19 To establish that a likelihood of confu-
sion exists in the customer's mind as to the source or origin of the
package or container sold by a competitor, a plaintiff must prove that
there is a public desire for a product made by the plaintiff.20 The pub-
lic desire must be for the manufacturer, not the product,2' and if there
the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their
diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.
S. REP. No. 1333, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1275.
15. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
16. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 1976). See
Public Interest, supra note 13 at 320.
17. See infra notes 53 and 54.
18. Vitek Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 675 F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1982); Purolator,
Inc. v. EFRA Distributors, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D.P.R. 1981), affd, 687 F.2d 554 (Ist Cir.
1982). The foundation of a trademark infringement action is a likelihood of confusion, mistake or
deception. Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694 n.10 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
19. Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
20. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper Laboratories, 536 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
21. American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979),
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is confusion, it must be confusion as to the origin of the product and
not as to the goods themselves. 22 This is known as the "likelihood of
confusion" standard, under which competitor-created confusion among
purchasers as to the source of goods becomes actionable.
23
The proper test under this standard is whether the defendant's
package or container has features which are of such character and are
used in such a way as to be likely to confuse a prospective buyer.24 The
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); Discount Muffler Shop v. Meineke Realty Corp., 535 F. Supp.
439, 447 (N.D. Ohio 1982). Identifying "the buying public is important because it is that public
which accepts a product's trademark and for whose protection, in part, the trademark laws are
promulgated." American Rice v. Arkansas Rice Growers Co-Op., 532 F. Supp. 1376, 1385 (S.D.
Tex. 1982).
22. As stated by the court in Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 235 F. Supp. 18
(N.D. Il. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1965):
The import of confusion is that the consumer must have something in mind, even
though it is somewhat vague, with which to confuse another product.
Unless the package collocation has acquired a secondary meaning. . . the plaintiff
is faced with what has been called "buyer indifference". The buyer to be deceived,
must be looking for something.
235 F. Supp. at 27.
The Fifth Circuit tilted this requirement somewhat in Boston Professional Hockey Assoc. v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). In
that case, the court enjoined the sale of hockey team logo patches. The public was purchasing
copies of plaintiff's mark itself and not relying on the trademark to identify its source. Consumers
selected the product because they wanted the trademark, not because they thought the patch iden-
tified the plaintiff's goods or that that plaintiff sponsored the product. The court acknowledged
this fact, stating the "decision here may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of pro-
tecting the public [from confusion] to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs .. .
510 F.2d at 1011.
Boston Hockey seems to hold that a trademark's owner has a complete monopoly over its
commercial use. The Lanham Act's scope, however, is much narrower. Its function is to protect
consumers against deceptive designations of the origin of goods and to allow manufacturers to
distinguish their goods from those of others. See HMH Publishing Co., Inc. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d
713,716 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Note, Developments in the Law- Trade-marks and Unfair Compe-
tition, 68 HARV. L. REV. 814, 816-17 (1955). It appears that the Fifth Circuit has retreated from
this broad interpretation. In Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549
F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977), the court stated that it "reject[ed] any notion that a trademark is an
owner's 'property' to be protected irrespective of its role in the protection of our markets," and
described the Boston Hockey decision as based on a finding that consumers were likely to believe
that the emblem somehow originated from the hockey clubs. 549 F.2d at 389.
23. "[C]onfusion cannot be assessed in a vacuum, [the] underlying and crucial importance
regarding a finding of 'likelihood of confusion' is the particular market, that is, the consuming
public the goods are directed toward." American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Co-Op.,
532 F. Supp. 1376, 1385 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
Under the federal statutory structure, trademark infringement is defined as the usage in com-
merce of "any... colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with. . . which such use
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a).
24. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); Exxon
Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 450, 457 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Invicta Plastics
(USA) Ltd. v. Mego Corp., 523 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Le Sport sac, Inc. v. Dockside
Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In deciding a case under the Lanham Act
and common law unfair competition for alleged violation of plaintiff's service mark rights, the
court in Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 705 (D.N.J. 1977) stated:
[Many of the cases cited regarding these trademark principles] deal with the issue of
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issue is not necessarily whether a defendant's package or trade dress is
identical to the plaintiff's in each and every particular, 25 but rather,
whether there is a similarity of the overall impression. 26
The deciding factor is whether a likelihood of confusion exists. In
testing for a likelihood of confusion, the court disregards small differ-
ences and looks to the overall appearance of the package as seen by a
potential purchaser.27 "The elements of the parties' dress, packaging
and labels to be considered are open-ended. Anything which the ordi-
nary purchaser sees should be considered. This includes size, shape,
color, design, texture, word and symbol marks of both the product and
its dress and package." 28 In addition to the similarity of the marks, 29
the courts consider extrinsic facts such as the types of goods,30 the
classes of prospective purchasers, 31 the competitive relationship of the
parties,32 the relationship between the channels of trade33 and the par-
trademark registerability, [but this] does not lessen their instructive value to this Court
considering the infringement of a registered mark. The issue of extending trademark
recognition and protection from infringement to a three-dimensional object patterned
after a registered two-dimensional mark, where the object undoubtedly has utilitarian
aspects not present in the source-indicating mark, must be answered by the application
of general trademark policy.
25. Fremont Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
26. MCCARTHY, infra note 28, § 8:1 at 230 (1973).
Actual proof of confusion is not necessary to obtain injunctive relief from a deceptively simi-
lar package when the action is brought at the incipiency of the alleged infringement: "[pilaintiff
should not be expected to stand by and await the dismal proof." De Costa v. CBS, Inc., 520 F.2d
499, 514 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). Of course, the opposite is also true.
"[Aifter the lapse of substantial time if no one appears to have been actually deceived, that fact is
strongly probative of the defense that there is no likelihood of deception....." Id., quoting from
3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 80.6 (3d ed. 1969).
A party seeking monetary damages must not only demonstrate a likelihood of confusion but
also that it has been damaged. Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1982).
See also Invicta Plastics (USA) Ltd. v. Mego Corp., 523 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
27. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972), wherein
even though both parties marketed a deodorant spray in identical cans, the labels were sufficiently
different to avoid confusion. See also Howw Mfg., Inc. v. Formac, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 793, 796
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
28. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:3 at 234 (1973) [hereinafter
MCCARTHY]; Water Gremlin Co. v. Ideal Fishing Float Co., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 809, 812 (D. Minn.
1975) (color).
29. "[Tlhe greater the similarity between the products and services [provided by the defend-
ant and plaintiff], the greater the likelihood of confusion." Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange
of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1980). Similarity, however, is not dispositive of the
issue. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1979).
30. Id See MCCARTHY, supra note 28 at §§ 23:3-16.
31. Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Dist., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 471, 476 (D.P.R. 1981), afJ'd, 687 F.2d
554 (1st Cir. 1982).
32. Id.
33. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Stubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th
Cir. 1982).
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ties' advertising, 34 the public awareness of plaintiff's trademark, 35 man-
ner of trademark use, 36 the degree of care likely to be exercised by
consumers, 37 the defendant's intent in adopting its mark,38 the trend
towards expansion in the respective trade or industry as to territory of
line of merchandise, 39 evidence of actual confusion 40 and the strength
of plaintiff's mark.
4'
34. Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Dist., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 471, 476 (D.P.R. 1981), aff6d, 687 F.2d
554 (ist Cir. 1982).
35. Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. Custom Cloud Motors, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
36. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper Labs, 536 F. Supp. 523, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
37. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Stubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648.
38. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 703-04 (5th Cir.
1981). Intent of the defendant in adopting a mark is only one of the factors to be considered.
However, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant adopted a mark with the intent of ob-
taining unfair commercial advantage from the reputation of the plaintiff, then "that fact alone
'may be sufficient to justify the inference that there is confusing similarity.'" Amstar Corp. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
Courts have often used the terms "passing off" and "palming off" in describing a guilty de-
fendant's conduct. "Palming off" or "passing off" is the selling of a good or service under the
name or mark of another. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 25:1. The terms historically were used in
the context of describing a "wrongful intent" on the part of the defendant to pass or palm off his
goods as being those of the plaintiff, but most courts have come to use the terms to describe cases
where likelihood of confusion is present. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 25:1. Thus, the courts
have shifted from emphasizing the wrongful action to emphasizing the effect on the customer.
The shift has come about in large part as the result of an effort by the courts to conform the test for
common-law trademark infringement with the test for statutory trademark infringement. MC-
CARTHY, supra note 28, §§ 23:1, 23:30.
"Reverse passing off," occurs when a person removes or obliterates the original trademark,
without authorization, before reselling goods produced by someone else. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v.
Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 1982); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp.
292, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd inpart, rev'd and remandedin part sub noma., Donsco, Inc. v. Casper
Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978).
In reverse passing-off cases, the originator of the misidentified product is deprived of the
advertising value of its name and of the good will that otherwise would stem from public knowl-
edge of the true source of the product. MCCARTHY, supra note 28 at § 3:5.
39. Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Dist., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 471 (D.P.R. 1981), aff'd, 687 F.2d 554
(Ist Cir. 1982).
40. Id. Although showing actual confusion could be significant, such evidence is not neces-
sary to a finding of likelihood of confusion. General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F.
Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Fremont Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q.
415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 728 (1938).
41. Determination of trademark strength is probably the most important factor in determin-
ing likelihood of confusion. Narwood Productions v. Lexington Broadcast Serv. Co., 541 F. Supp.
1243, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). What is intended by references to "strong" and "weak" marks is the
effect of such marks upon the mind of the consuming public. Strength was defined in McGregor-
Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979) as:
The term 'strength' as applied to trademarks refers to the distinctiveness of the mark, or
more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from
a particular, although possibly anonymous, source.
"A mark that is strong because of its fame or its uniqueness, is more likely to be remembered and
more likely to be associatdd in the public mind with a greater breadth of products or services, than
is a mark that is weak because [it is] relatively unknown or very like similar marks or very like the
name of the product." James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir.
1976). In general, "strong marks are given...protection over a wide range of related products
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Each product has its own separate threshold for confusion of ori-
gin. 4 2 If a product is relatively inexpensive, the customer will normally
pay less attention to what he is purchasing than if the item or service is
expensive.43 Therefore, less similarity between trademarks of inexpen-
sive goods is required to show likelihood of confusion than would be
required if the parties competed in a market of expensive goods."
The test of customer confusion is not whether the products can be
differentiated when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather
whether they create the same general overall impression.45 If the simi-
larities in appearance are such that they would be unduly confusing to
the average consumer, the defendant has violated the plaintiffs
rights.
46
The likelihood of confusion test refers to ordinary purchasers and
not to careless ones.47 It is the casual or ordinary, non-discerning buyer
and variations on appearance of the mark, [while] [wieak marks are given a narrow range of
protection both as to the products and as to visual variations." MCCARTHY, supra note 28,
§ 11:24. Strength of a mark may be derived from the intrinsic quality of the mark or from its
public history. E. I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). The ultimate test of a mark's strength is its actual recognition among the con-
suming public. Id. The court said:
Strength or weakness is primarily a question of assessment of a mark's distinctiveness or
popularity. Where the public has been educated to recognize and accept a particular
mark as the hallmark for a particular source of that product, or the mark itself is inher-
ently unique or has been the subject of wide advertisement, it is a strong trademark.
Id. For example, in Haig & Haig, Ltd. v. Maradel Products, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), plaintiff, a distiller of scotch whiskey, had registered trademarks for its name (PINCH) and
the shape of its bottle. Defendant copied the shape of the bottle for its after-shave lotion called
"Scotch 'n Soda" as well as for its bubble bath called "Pinchy." The court denied any relief on the
grounds that the bottle shape was weak and that because defendant's products were far different
from plaintiffs there would not be a likelihood of confusion.
42. The ascertainment of the probability of confusion resulting from the similarity of con-
figurations is not solvable by a precise rule or measure. It is a matter of varying human reactions
to situations and not capable of exact appraisement. Colburn v. Puritan Mills, 108 F.2d 377, 378-
79 (7th Cir. 1939). "The greater the value of an article the more careful the typical consumer can
be expected to be. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir.
1979).
43. RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979); Fisher Stoves,
Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980); LifeSavers Corp. v. Curtis
Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1950) (life savers); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231,
1244 (D. Kan. 1977) (drive-through photographic service).
44. See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. 961 (Ist Cir. 1980),
wherein the court held that customers purchasing expensive wood burning stoves would not be
confused because each manufacturer displayed its name and logo prominently, clearly identifying
its origin.
45. Paco Rabanne Parfums, S.A. v. Norco Enterprises, Inc., 680 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1982);
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976); Waples-Platter
Companies v. General Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 575 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
46. Sun-Fun Products v. Suntan Research & Dev., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1981).
47. American Diabetes Ass'n v. National Diabetes Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 16, 21 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
aff'd, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982).
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who is to be protected.4 8 In weighing the evidence of the likelihood of
confusion, the court strives to place itself in the shoes of the ordinary
prospective purchaser, using his ability to discriminate and taking into
account his propensity for carelessness.
49
Until 1964, packages and containers, like product shapes, were
protectable and registerable only if they were distinctive and if the con-
tents were identifiable as belonging to a particular source. If a manu-
facturer's package or container had acquired secondary meaning, a
competitor was forbidden from simulating its design.50 If the simulated
package or container design was functional, a competitor could freely
simulate its appearance.51 This was so even if the shape had acquired
secondary meaning. The originator was denied any interest therein to
avoid creating a monopoly in non-patented functional features.5 2
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. St!iftel Co., 3 and in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,54 ap-
peared to wipe out over 100 years of common law dealing with unfair
competition55 by holding that protection against copying--other than
48. Some courts, however, have held that a higher standard of care is required on the buyer's
part. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated "A new competitor is not held to the obliga-
tions of an insurer against all possible confusion. He is not obligated to protect the negligent and
inattentive purchaser from confusion resulting from indifference." Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss
Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 8 (7th Cir. 1950).
Another court stated it would disregard the "undiscriminating prospective purchaser" and be
guided by the effect upon the person who looks for brand names. Chun King Sales, Inc. v. Orien-
tal Foods, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 659, 663 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 244 F.2d 909 (9th
Cir. 1957).
In Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Kan. 1977), the court, finding defend-
ant's copying of plaintiff's building shape for drive-thru photographic services illegal, stated that
no matter how different the buildings were there would still be some confusion. Such "irrelevant
confusion" was not protectable. Id. at 1240. However, those people falling between these less
observant and more observant people, are entitled to protection from being confused. Id.
See Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1191 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (defendant "is
not obligated to protect the negligent and inattentive purchaser from confusion resulting from
indifference, or make the market foolproof").
Judge Learned Hand criticized the Seventh Circuit's Life Savers ruling, stating that "we must
leave the last word to the Supreme Court." American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 208
F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1953). In fact, the Supreme Court did state in an early case that the test is
one of likelihood of confusion to "the ordinary purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and
caution in such matters .. " McLean v. Flemming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877).
49. See, e.g., Buitoni Foods Corp. v. Gio. Buton & C.S.P.A., 530 F. Supp. 949, 972 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 680 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1982).
50. West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 593 (6th Cir. 1955); New
England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418 (1 st Cir. 1951); MCCARTHY, supra note 28,
§ 7:23, at 189.
51. Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1957); MCCARTHY,
supra note 28, § 7:23.
52. Alan Wood Steel Co., 150 F. Supp. at 862.
53. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
54. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
55. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 7:24.
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that afforded by the constitutionally authorized patent system-is not
permissible. 56 The Supreme Court held that federal patent laws pre-
empted state causes of action for unfair competition based upon the
alleged copying of unpatented products.
57
In the Sears case, the Stiffel Company had obtained design and
mechanical patents covering the design and operation of a "pole
lamp."' 58 Sears sold an exact copy. 59 There was no evidence that the
Stiffel lamp had acquired secondary meaning.
60
The district court and Seventh Circuit found that Stiffel's patents
were invalid, but held that the copying by Sears constituted unfair
competition under Illinois common law because there was a likelihood
of confusion of buyers as to source. 6' The Supreme Court, however,
reversed, holding that the state had no power to require Sears to change
the design of its lamp.62 The Supreme Court held that a state could
not, consistent with the United States Constitution, extend the life of a
federal patent beyond its expiration date, or give protection to things
which did not qualify for federal patent protection. 63 The Court found
the fact that there would be a likelihood of confusion caused by the
look-alike lamps was irrelevant. 64 The Court stated:
Of course there could be 'confusion' as to who had manufactured
these nearly identical articles. But mere inability of the public to tell
two identical articles apart is not enough to support an injunction
against copying or an award of damages for copying that which the
federal patent laws permit to be copied.
65
In the Compco case, the Day-Brite Lighting Company had ob-
tained a design patent on a fluorescent light fixture reflector which had
cross-ribs claimed to give it both strength and attractiveness. 66
Compco marketed a reflector with the same overall appearance as the
Day-Brite reflector. 67 As in Sears, the district and appellate courts held
the patent invalid, 68 but the courts enjoined the Compco Company
56. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231; Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
57. Id.
58. 376 U.S. at 225-26.
59. Id. at 226.
60. Id.
61. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) (which includes a sum-
mary of the unreported district court opinion).
62. 376 U.S. at 232-33.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 232.
65. Id.
66. 376 U.S. at 234.
67. Id. at 235.
68. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Co., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962) (which includes a
summary of the unreported district court opinion).
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from making and selling its reflector on the basis of Illinois Unfair
Competition Law.69 The appellate court found that the concurrent sale
of the two products was likely to cause confusion in the trade.70 How-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that even though the reflec-
tor was nonfunctional, had acquired secondary meaning and
defendant's copy was likely to cause confusion, no injunction against
copying could be granted.
7'
According to the Supreme Court in the Sears and Compco cases,
lower courts could not enjoin the copying of an article unprotected by
patent or copyright, since such an injunction would be inconsistent
with federal patent and copyright policy. 72 The Court said that even
though the design of an article might cause confusion among purchas-
ers as to the identity of the article's producer, that could not furnish a
basis for prohibiting the copying or selling of the article regardless of
the copier's motives.73 Secondary meaning and functionality were held
relevant only to a possible application of state law requiring labeling or
precautions to correctly identify the source of products. 74
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id.
71. 376 U.S. at 237.
72. "[Mlere inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to support
an injunction against copying." Sears, 376 U.S. at 232.
73. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
74. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232 (footnotes omitted). The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("Act"), adopted by most states in one form or another (see Alexander and Coil, The Impact of
New State Unfair Trade Practices Acts on the Field of Unfair Competition, 67 TRADE-MARK REP.
625, 630 (1977)) was drafted with the Sears and Compco decisions in mind. The Act, in part,
reads:
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business,
vocation or occupation, he:
(i) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, spon-
sorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connec-
tion or association with or certification by another;
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confu-
sion or of misunderstanding.
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 312.
Section 313 provides for injunctive relief against violators as follows:
A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may be granted
injunctive relief upon terms that the court considers reasonable. ***Relief granted for
the copying of an article shall be limited to the prevention of confusion or misunder-
standing as to source (emphasis supplied).
The word "article" is defined in the Act as "a product as distinguished from a trademark, label or
distinctive dress packaging. ... 1§311(1)1. The notes to the Act set forth the significance of this
definition and its application.
The definition of"article" in Section 311(I) of the Act, when read with the restriction on
the granting of relief found in Section 313, clearly indicates that injunctive relief against
copying is prohibited only with respect to articles, and is not restricted with respect to
trademarks, labels or distinctive dress or packaging.
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Sears and Compco did not decide, or even consider, the bounda-
ries between federal patent75 and federal trademark law. Though the
patent and trademark laws provide overlapping protection to the quali-
fying package or container shape, a design patent grant and a trade-
mark registration are based upon entirely different legal theories.
76
On the one hand, patent protections are statutory rights and patent
principles require inventive novelty and nonobviousness. 77 When pro-
tection is granted, it gives the holder monopoly power to exclude any-
one, for a limited period of time, from making, using or selling the
patented object, regardless of whether the infringer is in competition.
78
S.H.A. ch. 1211/ , § 313 Illinois Notes. See David Grossman Designs, Inc. v. Bortin, 347 F. Supp.
1150, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
The Act prevents conduct which is likely to confuse purchasers as to the source of a product,
including the copying of distinctive packaging. Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc.,
19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 311 N.E.2d 386 (1974). Like the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must establish not
just confusion but a likelihood of source confusion, which can only arise when the first seller's
product is associated by the public with a particular source of supply. Id. Similarly, the package
shape must not be functional. Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery Co. v. Moline Supply Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d,
145, 151, 360 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1977).
The Act is merely a codification of the Illinois common law of unfair competition. Dawn
Associates v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1978); National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d 814, 819-20, 327 N.E.2d 242, 247 (1975).
75. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (Design Patent Act). There are two types of patents: (I) functional
(or utilitarian) and (2) design. See, e.g., Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1031 (1968). See McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair
Competition Law During the Decade of the 1970's, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 93 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as "Important Trends"].
76. It would appear that granting trademark protection to the subject of an invalid or expired
design patent would be in direct violation of the Sears-Compco doctrine in that a court may not
extend the life of a design patent beyond its expiration date or give protection to an article which
lacks the invention required for a federal patent within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, however, did not determine whether Congress can enact legislation such
as the Lanham Act under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, providing for the recognition
and protection of the subject matter of a design patent as a trademark. Electric Storage Battery
Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 143 U.S.P.Q. 163, 166-67 (T.T.A.B. 1964).
In In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), the court sustained com-
mon law trademark status upon a wine bottle configuration because this grant represented the
granting of rights wholly distinct from those accorded by the federal patent laws. The dual protec-
tion from both design patent and trademark law may exist where the product shape is ornamental
and also serves to identify its source.
See also Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976), and Application of Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
77. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976 Supp. V 1981). See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536
F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Application of Honeywell, Inc., 497
F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974); R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's Inc.,
236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956). The requirement of invention in a design patent is not satisfied by a
design which is merely new and pleasing. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 7:30.
78. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8:
[tlo promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
The policy of the United States patent laws is that one who has invested time and labor in devel-
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On the other hand, trademark rights are common law rights aris-
ing from the use of a distinctive mark which identifies one's goods 79
and which distinguishes them from those manufactured and sold by
others.8 0 Trademark registration does not require invention or nov-
elty8l but is premised upon rights developed through actual use.82 This
constitutes an acknowledgement that the container or package acts as
an indication of the source of origin for the product contained in the
package.83 Protection is not limited in time and may extend for an
unlimited period unless lost by nonuse, misuse or overuse.8 4
Moreover, federal trademark law serves the dual purpose of pro-
tecting both the trademark owner and the public from confusion, mis-
take and deception. 5 Registration only precludes others from copying
the configuration on similar or related goods which might create confu-
sion or deception among potential purchasers.8 6
A number of subsequent lower court decisions reveal significant
judicial dissatisfaction with the Sears and Compco rationale and have
viewed the actual holdings of Sears and Compco very narrowly. 87
Courts have continued to uphold protection against the unfair copying
oping a new product shall have the benefit of his invention, by being given the right to exclude
others completely from the use of his invention. Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Electronics Corp., 190
U.S.P.Q. 546, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
79. Section 45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1127) defines "trademark" as "any word,
name, symbol or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others."
80. Application of Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1080 (1974).
81. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
82. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 16.1.
83. The issue of whether a bottle configuration may obtain trademark registration during the
life of its design patent was decided in Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925
(C.C.P.A. 1964). There, the court discussed the distinction between patent law and trademark
law. (See notes 77-78, supra). In the concurring opinion, Chief Judge Worley stated that the real
issue was whether competition would be hindered.
84. When a mark is abandoned, it falls into the public domain as a matter of law and is
subject to appropriation by the next person to control the nature and quality of the mark. Man-
hattan Indus., Inc. v. Sweater Bee By Banff Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Phi
Delta Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (antitrust
misuse).
Nonuse for a sufficiently long period of time may give rise to an abandonment. American
Photographic Publishing Co. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 135 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1943). Under
the Lanham Act nonuse for two consecutive years is prima facie evidence of abandonment. 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
85. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976).
86. Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1976). In In re
Pepsi-Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959), the court held that while a design patent allows
the patentee to prevent any manufacture or use of a protected configuration, trademark protection
is of a more limited scope and only registers the holder's rights to use the mark as an identifier of
his goods.
87. The Second, Third and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have recently held that the
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of packaging which will create a likelihood of confusion as to source.
These decisions refer to the Sears exception for "distinctive dress in the
packaging of goods."88 Where the traditional tests of secondary mean-
ing, nonfunctionality, and likelihood of confusion are met, copying will
still be prohibited.8 9
Courts have also drawn the distinction between products and
packaging referred to in Sears and Compco. Unlike the pole lamp and
fluorescent lighting fixture, containers and packages are not ordinarily
considered "products." 90 The package is simply a nonfunctional fea-
ture of the product. 91 It is not a part of, and has no relation to, the
product itself.
92
A package or container only acquires trademark significance for
Sears-Compco doctrine did not address itself to rights recognized by § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
which makes certain kinds of unfair competition federal statutory torts.
In Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976), the court ignored Sears and Compco. In that case, plaintiff sought relief under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act when defendant copied the exterior design of the plaintiffs semi-trailer.
The court stated that the Supreme Court's discussion of the questions of functionality and secon-
dary meaning was mere dictum. Id. at 1214. Thus, the finding that the existence of the federal
patent law prohibits liability for the copying of unpatented features was rejected.
Similarly, in Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976), the
court protected the ice cream cone shape of a parking meter cover which was non-functional and
had secondary meaning. Following the Eighth Circuit's Fruehauf decision, the court held that the
trademark laws protect interests distinct from those under the patent laws. See also S K & F Co.
v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1064 (3d Cir. 1980) and Ives Labs, Inc. v. Darby Drug
Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1979).
Even the Supreme Court appears to have eroded the Sears-Compco holdings in later cases.
For example, in Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), the Supreme Court held that a patent
licensee was not estopped to deny the validity of a licensor's patent when sued for royalties.
In Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), petitioners challenged the California statute
prohibiting record or tape piracy as being violative of the copyright clause of the Constitution.
The Court, indicating that states may wield more power in the area of unfair competition, upheld
the statute, stating that the Copyright Clause of the Federal Constitution does not vest the power
to issue copyrights solely in the federal government.
Similarly, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the court held that States
may exercise regulatory power over discoveries. Trade secret protection was not federally pre-
empted because the patent law did not explicitly endorse or forbid the operation of trade secret
law and the objectives of each were not in conflict. See also Important Trends, supra note 75, at
98.
88. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232.
89. Normally, trade dress is thought to include packages, boxes and bottles (see note 90,
infra) and this would seem to include within the Court's exception the many cases concerning the
configuration of packages which hold products.
90. Package and container configurations are considered to be only a part of a product's
"trade dress." See Paco Rabarme Parfums, S.A. etc. v. Norco Enterprises, Inc., 680 F.2d 891, 892
(2d Cir. 1982); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Chinese Arts & Crafts, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 375, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); St. Ives Labs v. Nature's Own Labs, 529 F. Supp. 347, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
91. See, e.g., In re Days-Ease Home Products Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 566, 567-68 (T.T.A.B.
1977); In re Fre-Mar Industries, Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 364, 365, 367 (T.T.A.B. 1968); In re Int'l
Playtex Corp., 153 U.S.P.Q. 377, 378 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
92. Id.
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the enclosed product 93 and, for the most part, may be used by others
for unrelated products.94 Thus, the Sears-Compco rule which permits
one to sell an identical copy of a competitor's public domain product
95
does not give a competitor the freedom to imitate the appearance of the
package or container in which that product is sold. 96 The Sears-
Compco cases permitting product imitation thus appear to have no real
applicability to the container or package in which the product is sold.
97
Courts have also disregarded the Sears and Compco decisions on
the ground that the Lanham Act 98 is a federal statute.99 Therefore, the
preemption theories of Sears and Compco are not controlling because
they dealt only with the protection of product design under state unfair
competition law.'00 The focus of both Sears and Compco was the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution-whether state law can extend
the effective term of patent protection granted by federal statutes.'0'
The Supreme Court in Sears-Compco had no occasion to discuss, in
even general terms, legal recognition and protection of the subject mat-
ter of a design patent as a trademark.
0 2
PROTECTION OF PACKAGING AND CONTAINERS-THE LANHAM ACT
AND MORE
Congress, by authority of the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution, has given federal recognition to the public interest
in recognizing trademarks to prevent confusion, mistake and decep-
tion. 0 3 If the public recognizes and accepts a package or container
93. Id.
94. Haig & Haig, Ltd. v. Maradel Products, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
95. Le Sportssac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
99. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 823 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981).
100. Id See notes 75 through 86 supra.
101. Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D.N.J. 1976).
102. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
103. As stated in Ives, supra note 102:
It is surely true that in the Sears and Compeo opinions the Supreme Court said noth-
ing about the federal tort created by Section 43(a). Stiffel's and Day-Bright's claims were
treated as resting solely on state unfair competition law which was held invalid as in
conflict with federal patent law. The opinions can be read as limited to rights claimed
under state unfair competition law granting protection equivalent to that of federal pat-
ent or copyright laws for products not enjoying valid patents or copyright protection.
The Court, it can be strongly argued, had no need to be concerned with marking out the
boundaries of a federal tort over which it had complete control and which Congress
could contract if the courts were pressing it further than that body desired. The Eighth
Circuit took essentially this position in Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,
536 F.2d 1210, 1214-15, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, 97 S. Ct. 164, 50 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1976).
TRADEMARK PROTECTION
shape in a trademark sense, its owner seeks only federal recognition of
that interest and the public is protected. The trademark laws take
nothing from the "public domain;" they merely grant federal recogni-
tion to existing private and public interests.' °4
The courts have thus continued to acknowledge an owner's rights
in package and container configurations both under the Lanham Act
and common law unfair competition when the owner establishes secon-
dary meaning (or distinctiveness) and nonfunctionality.
A. The Lanham Act
The purpose of the Lanham Act 0 5 is to protect source identifica-
tion rights, Io6the good will of the product and business, 07 and the pub-
lic from confusion due to deceptive trademarks. 0 8 A trademark is a
distinctive mark of authenticity through which the merchandise or
services of a particular producer or manufacturer may be distinguished
from those of competitors. 0 9 Distinctive packaging, like a name or
product shape, may indicate the source or origin of a product." 0
Where the container or package shape functions as a product's label,
the right to prevent a competitor's simulation of that shape can only
grow out of actual use and consumer identification with the user."'
Under such circumstances, duplication by a competitor could lead to
consumer confusion as to the product's source. Accordingly, a non-
The court there sustained claim under § 43(a) for copying the exterior design of a hopper
grain trailer which was found to be nonfunctional and to have acquired secondary mean-
ing. While we previously left this question open. . .we are now prepared to agree with
the Eighth Circuit.
601 F.2d at 642 (footnotes omitted).
104. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d at 1210, 1214-15.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
106. Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (D. Kan. 1977).
107. James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); Scarves
By Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1976). This includes protecting
the senior user's "interest [in] preventing others from getting a free ride on the reputation and
good will he has established. ... Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp.
1220, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afj'd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
108. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 545 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
109. Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (D. Kan. 1977); John Morrell & Co.
v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314, 316 (7th Cir. 1961); Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co.,
182 F.2d 4, 7 (7th Cir. 1950).
110. Source Perrier, S.A. v. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 617, 619 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 181 U.S.P.Q. 59 (T.T.A.B. 1973); In re Fre-Mar Industries,
Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 364 (T.T.A.B. 1968); In re International Playtex Corp., 153 U.S.P.Q. 377
(T.T.A.B. 1967); Ex Parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r Pats. 1958).
111. See, e.g., Paco Rabanne Parfums, S.A. v. Norco Enterprises, Inc., 680 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.
1982); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Chinese Arts & Crafts, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); St. Ives
Labs v. Nature's Own Laboratories, 529 F. Supp. 347 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
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functional feature is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act if that
feature has acquired a secondary meaning (or is inherently distinctive)
and if its use by a competitor is likely to cause customer confusion as to
the product's source." 1
2
Intent by a businessman to utilize a container or package shape as
a trademark, however, is, in and of itself, insufficient." 3 Not every-
thing that a person adopts and uses with the intent that it function as a
trademark necessarily achieves this status or is legally capable of doing
So. 1 14 Similarly, not everything that is recognized or associated with a
single source is necessarily a protectable mark. 1 5 The shape itself must
be such that it is nonfunctional and such that the purchaser will realize
that, upon viewing the configuration, it is the manufacturer's mark
identifying the product." 16
Trademark Registration
Registration on either the Federal Principal Register" 17 or Supple-
mental" 8 Register does not enlarge the trademark owner's substantive
rights." t9 Trademark rights are common law rights arising from the
appropriation and use of a distinctive mark in one's business. 20 The
112. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir.
198 1) (no proof of secondary meaning necessary if package configuration is arbitrary or distinc-
tive); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (proof of
nonfunctionality and secondary meaning required); Anus Corp. v. Nordic Co., Inc., 512 F. Supp.
1184, 1188 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Mark Charcoal Co., Inc. v. Almarc Mfg. Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. 1076, 1077
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
113. In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 841, 843-44 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Port-A-Hut, Inc.,
183 U.S.P.Q. 680, 682 (T.T.A.B. 1974); Filter Dynamics Int'l v. Astron Battery, 19 Il. App. 3d 299,
306, 311 N.E.2d 386 (1974).
114. In re Weber-Stephen Products Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 509, 511 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
115. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); In re Water Gremlin Co., 635
F.2d 841, 844 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Certain Steel Toy Vehicles, 197 U.S.P.Q. 873, 887 (I.T.C.
1978); In re Weber-Stephen Products Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 509, 511 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
116. In re Bell Electric Co., 192 U.S.P.Q. 395, 399 (T.T.A.B. 1976). As stated in Keene Corp.
v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981):
[Mie see nothing inconsistent between a finding that a distinctive design has become
sufficiently identified with its original producer to serve as an indication of its source and
a finding that the design is nonetheless not insignificantly related to its utilitarian func-
tion. [Clourts have generally treated the issue of functionality. . .as a separate consider-
ation from secondary meaning.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
119. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (lst Cir. 1980); Griesedieck West-
ern Brewing Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149 F.2d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1945); Schwinn Bicycle Co.
v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 979 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
120. Keebler, 624 F.2d at 372; Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1975);
Schwinn, 339 F. Supp. at 979; In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
Common law rights grow out of priority of use. Visa Int'l Service Assoc. v. Visa Realtors, 208
U.S.P.Q. 462, 463-64 (T.T.A.B. 1980).
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Lanham Act simply codifies these rights.' 2' Registration is a recording
method by which to notify and inform the public and competitors that
rights are asserted in a particular mark.
22
The Lanham Act does, however, give registrants certain proce-
dural advantages. 123 Registration grants the registrant the right to sue
in federal court without regard to diversity of citizenship or the amount
in controversy, 124 prevents the registration of the same or of a confus-
ingly similar mark upon either register by another party, 125 and enables
the registrant to recover damages, attorney's fees and obtain injunctive
relief against an infringer.1
26
Principal Registrants 27 are granted additional rights: primafacie
evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
121. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961). The effect of Lanham
Act registration is to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff, who in a common law infringe-
ment action would have to establish his right to exclusive use, to the defendant, who must first
introduce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of plaintiffs right to such use. Dan Rob-
bins & Associates, Inc. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
122. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 979 (M.D. Tenn. 1971),
aft'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972). A condition precedent to obtaining a federal registration is
prior use in interstate or international commerce or in commerce with the Indian Tribes. Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
123. See infra notes 125 through 130. Although the rights obtained from registration are, for
the most part, procedural; the registrant obtains the right to exclude a prior user from those parts
of the United States in which he was not actually using the mark prior to the federal registration.
In other words, the first to obtain a federal registration may restrict a prior user to the geographi-
cal territory in which he was actually using the mark before the registration occurred. Dawn
Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
The rule that trademark rights arise solely from use should not detract from the substantive
value of federal registration. Palladino, Trademarks and Competition: The IVES Case, 15 J. MAR.
L. REV. 319, 320 n.7 (1982).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 provides that a successful
plaintiff is entitled (subject to the principles of equity) "to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff and (3) the costs of the action." The trial court also has discre-
tion to award judgment for up to three times the amount of actual damages "according to the
circumstances of the case" and states that "[if the Court shall find that the amount of the recovery
based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for
such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case." This
Section also now provides for an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in
"exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117 now applies to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See Metric & Multis-
tandard Components v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1980).
With regard to the issue of compensatory remedies, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 is not considered to be a
model of clarity in draftsmanship. In fact, it has led one court to conclude that "[u]nless there is at
least some evidence of harm arising from defendant's violation, a court may not award a money
judgment based on profits or damages." Electronics Corp. of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 1230, 1234 (D. Mass.), ar"dper curiam, 487 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
960 (1974). However, a decision to order an accounting is addressed in large measure to the
discretion of the trial court. Fuller Products Co. v. Fuller Brush Co., 299 F.2d 772, 777 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962).
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 (1976 Supp. V 1981). See notes 141 through 146 infra.
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connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate; 28 the
right, after continuous use of the mark for five years after registration,
to have the registration become incontestable and thereby constitute
conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the
mark; 129 and the ability to prevent goods from being imported into the
United States bearing infringing marks. '
30
A configuration or shape of a container itself is not, however, re-
gisterable.13 ' It may be registerable for the particular contents
thereof' 32 if the selection of the package or container shape is not dic-
tated solely by functional, ornamental, or any consideration other than
to create an arbitrary shape which indicates origin and distinguishes
the applicant's goods in commerce. 133 These considerations apply
equally to registration on both registers.'
34
At common law, no trademark rights as such existed for the shape
of a package or container. In 1946, Congress enacted § 23 of the Lan-
ham Act 135 providing for the registration on the Supplemental Register
of, among other things, a mark which constitutes a "package."'' 36 Re-
gistration on the Supplemental Register constitutes recognition that the
package is nonfunctional, capable of indicating origin and capable of
distinguishing the registrant's products from other products. 37 Such
registration acts as an initial step to obtaining acceptance on the Princi-
pal Register.1
38
128. Federal registration on the Principal Register constitutes constructive notice to the world
of the exclusive right of the registrant to use that mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1057 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
See also § 1115(a).
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b) (1976 Supp. V 1981).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
131. In re Days-Ease Home Products Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 566, 567-68 (T.T.A.B. 1977); In re
Semel, 189 U.S.P.Q. 285, 286 (T.T.A.B. 1975); In re Fre-Mar Industries, Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 364,
365 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
132. Id.
133. In re Winnebago Industries, Inc., 174 U.S.P.Q. 404 (T.T.A.B. 1972). In In re Fre-Mar
Industries, Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 364 (T.T.A.B. 1968), the applicant sought to register a canister
shaped like a flashlight as a container for tire repair products. The shape, while functional for a
flashlight, was distinctive for holding such products. It was adopted for the principal purpose of
identifying the applicant and any functional features, such as the gripping surface, were simply
incidental thereto. Accordingly, it was held to be registerable as a trademark.
134. In re Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 181 U.S.P.Q. 59, 60 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 states:
For the purposes of registration on the supplemental register, a mark may consist of
any trade-mark, symbol, label, package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan,
phrase, surname, geographical name, numeral, or device or any combination of the fore-
going, but such mark must be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services.
(emphasis supplied).
137. Application of Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
138. Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r Pats. 1958). A mark must have
been used for one year preceding the filing of an application for registration on the Supplemental
TRADEMARK PROTECTION
The package or container shape may become eligible for registra-
tion on the Principal Register if and when it acquires secondary mean-
ing through customer association with the source. 139 Registration on
the Supplemental Register affords the registrant no presumptive right
to exclusive use.140
Registration on the Federal Principal Register requires either that
the mark is arbitrary or inherently distinctive,' 4 1 or if the configuration
is not inherently distinctive, it must be proven to have acquired secon-
dary meaning. 42 In other words, an applicant must present proof that
a nondistinctive package or container creates a commercial impression
separate and apart from the label and word marks appearing on the
label. An applicant must show that the package serves as an indication
of origin for the product inside the package or container.
There is no express provision in the Lanham Act for registration of
container or package configurations on the Principal Register. 43 By
1960, however, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the
§ 45 list of "word, name, symbol or device"'" was not an all-inclusive
list, but that other types of marks were included within the list.'
45
Thus, container configurations also became registerable as trademarks
on the Federal Principal Register. 46
Functionality
The doctrine of functionality has played a large role in limiting
trademark and common law protection for package and container
shapes. Trademark law did not develop to protect function, 47 but to
Register. 15 U.S.C. § 1091. This has been referred to as a "period of incubation." MCCARTHY,
supra note 28, § 19:8 at 665.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (1976 Supp. V 1981).
141. In re Fre-Mar Industries, Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 364 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (flashlight shaped
container for tire repair tools) and In re International Playtex Corp., 153 U.S.P.Q. 377, 378
(T.T.A.B. 1967) (ice cream cone shaped container for baby pants).
142. Application of Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (§ 45 of the Lanham Act). See supra note 79.
144. See infra note 146.
145. In re Kotzin, 276 F.2d 411, 414 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
146. In the case of Ex Parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r Pats. 1958) the
applicant's distinctive PINCH bottle for scotch whiskey was granted registration on the Principal
Register. Although the Principal Register did not expressly provide for "packages" or "contain-
ers," the Commissioner held that the nature of the article cannot preclude registration. The deci-
sive question is whether the applicant's bottle functions as a trademark. The evidence established
that the bottle had acquired a secondary meaning and registration was granted.
147. The nonfunctionality requirement is not created by statute but by court decisions. In re
Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 931 (C.C.P.A. 1964). See In re Water Gremlin Co., 635
F.2d 841 (C.C.P.A. 1980), wherein the court refused to register a package design made to contain
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protect the trademark owner's integrity of identity and to protect the
public from confusion, mistake and deception. 148 There is an overrid-
ing public policy of preventing monopolization of use of the container
or package shapes which are mainly functional or utilitarian as op-
posed to shapes which are mainly arbitrary, artistic and designed to
perform a source-indicating purpose. 149 This is based upon a desire to
assure the continued viability of the common law right to copy essen-
tial features of marketable products. 150 Where, however, competition
in the underlying product can be undertaken without necessarily
adopting the competitor's non-functional designs, the law can grant
protection to such designs.15'
In determining whether a package is registerable under the Lan-
ham Act, the law requires that the configuration must be essentially
functional in order to bar registration.1 52 The fact that a purely arbi-
trary container configuration may perform a function which could be
served equally well by containers of many other shapes will not itself
preclude trademark registerability if secondary meaning is estab-
lished. 53 Where a shape or feature of construction is arbitrary it may
become a legally recognizable trademark because there is no public in-
terest to be protected.' 54 In other words, protection is not denied
fishing sinkers because the configuration was considered functional. For a recent discussion of
functionality, see Zelnick, The Doctrine of Functionality, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 128 (1983).
148. See supra notes 106 through 117.
149. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); Vuitton et Fils
S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1981); Application of Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
150. As stated long ago in Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265, 269 (N.D.
ILL.), aft'd, 245 F. 988 (7th Cir. 1917):
[Where the particular form is adopted to carry out economic, structural or functional
requirements, such act is no evidence of fraud or unfair competition. Necessary ele-
ments of mechanical construction, essential to the practical operation of a device and
which cannot be changed without either lessening the efficiency or materially increasing
expense, afford no presumption of an interest to compete unfairly.
151. Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 913-14 (D.N.J. 1976).
152. Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504-06 (C.C.P.A. 1961); In re Hollaender Mfg. Co., 181 U.S.P.Q.
603, 604 (T.T.A.B. 1974), aft'd, 511 F.2d 1186 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
153. Many shapes perform some utilitarian purpose but will not be considered "functional" in
a trademark sense. In re Deister Concentrator Co., Inc., 289 F.2d 496, 506 (C.C.P.A. 1961). In
Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976), an ice-cream cone-
shaped parking meter cover was held protectable even though it contained the parking meter
components. Similarly, in In re Fre-Mar Industries, Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 364 (T.T.A.B. 1968), a
flashlight shaped container for automobile tire repair parts was protectable even though it also
functioned to contain the repair materials and in In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539
(C.C.P.A. 1967), a wine decanter configuration could be protected (if secondary meaning was
established) even though it functioned to hold wine.
154. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Chinese Arts & Crafts, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 375, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(packaging for the Rubik's cube); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D.
Hawaii 1979), a'd, 662 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass,
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merely because the shape or feature also serves a useful purpose. 55
If, on the other hand, the package shape or feature contributes
only to its utility, durability or effectiveness or the use with which it
serves its function, it cannot be protected. 56 This rule is to permit the
public to benefit from useful progress in the industrial and commercial
arts. 
157
The question of functionality is not whether the mark itself, con-
sidered alone, is functional, but whether the mark, in relation to the
product it contains is a functional part of that product. 5 8  The princi-
pal issue is whether the configuration was dictated by functional or util-
itarian considerations or by a conscious effort to create an arbitrary
design or shape to indicate origin and distinguish the applicant's
goods. 59 In other words, was the shape adopted primarily to be orna-
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1976). If a mark increases consumer appeal only because of
the quality associated with plaintiffs products, or because of the prestige associated with owning
plaintiff's products, then the design is serving the legitimate function of a trademark. Vuitton et
Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 1981).
155. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 485 (D. Neb. 1982); Artus Corp. v.
Nordic Co., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1188 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Application of World's Finest Choco-
late, Inc., 474 F,2d 1012, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (shape of chocolate bar); Marion Laboratories, Inc.
v. Michigan Pharm. Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762, 766-67 (E.D. Mich. 1972), afl'd, 473 F.2d 910 (6th
Cir. 1973) (color of gelatin drug capsule).
156. Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Hawell Co., 191 F. 979, 981 (7th Cir.
1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912); Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265,
269 (N.D. 111. 1917), aft'dper curiam, 245 F. 988 (7th Cir. 1917); In re Hollaender Mfg. Co., 181
U.S.P.Q. 603, 605 (T.T.A.B. 1974), aft'd, 511 F.2d 1186 (C.C.P.A. 1975); MCCARTHY, supra note
28, § 7:26.
See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1980), wherein
plaintiff and defendant manufactured and sold very similar looking woodburning stoves. The
court held the stove shape functional and not protectable. The two-level top, allegedly the most
distinctive feature of plaintiffs stove, served the functions of permitting better combustion, pro-
viding cooking surfaces of different temperatures and preventing smoke from escaping when the
door was open.
Similarly, in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Tenn.
1971), aj7'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972), plaintiff manufactured and sold bicycles, parts and
accessories. A necessary item of a bicycle is its rim. Schwinn found that knurling the inner sur-
face effectively camouflaged the unsightly seam weld. Defendant did the same and Schwinn sued
alleging the knurl was an identifying object for its product. The court denied relief, finding it was
commercially necessary to hide the appearance resulting from welding certain sections together.
The only processes other than knurling were much more complex and expensive. Accordingly,
the knurling markings affected the facility or economy of processing the rim, making it functional
and unprotectable. There were simply no viable alternatives.
In Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 311 N.E.2d 386
(1974), plaintiff sought to protect the shape of a display package for automotive batteries. The
shape, however, was not unusual nor did it contain any curved edges, bulges or extensions that
would depart from a functional design. Accordingly, protection was denied.
157. In re Certain Steel Toy Vehicles, 197 U.S.P.Q. 873, 887 (I.T.C. 1978); Best Lock Corp. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
158. See P. Ferrero & C.S.P.A. v. Life Savers, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (rectangu-
lar shaped, transparent plastic container held functional for candy mints).
159. Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 705-06 (D.N.J. 1977).
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mental, or to make the goods easier to pack, to use or to make even
more saleable. 6
0
The fact that a design is recognizable as a source of origin is not
alone sufficient to make it protectable or registerable.' 6' Functional
shapes, though they may have attained a secondary meaning, are not
entitled to trademark registration. 62 The general consideration is
whether the configuration was dictated by functional or utilitarian con-
siderations or by a conscious effort to create an arbitrary shape to indi-
cate origin and distinguish one's goods. 163  If a part or feature is
functional to the configuration, then all similar configurations will have
a similar functional part or feature.164 Such part or feature will not,
therefore, be significant in identifying the configuration or in distin-
guishing between similar configurations. 165 A purchaser would not
think a functional part or feature was placed there to indicate who
manufactured it. He would think it was put there simply because it is
part of the nature of the product and is part of what makes it work. 166
The entire functionality doctrine stems from the public interest in
enhancing competition. 67 The question, as set forth in the Restate-
160. In re Oscar Meyer & Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. 295 (T.T.A.B. 1975), wherein the applicant sought
to register a package configuration for sliced luncheon meats on the Supplemental Register. The
application was rejected, however, on the ground that the transparent plastic cover with two
ribbed cylindrical pockets was primarily and essentially functional.
161. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Hol-
laender Mfg. Co., 181 U.S.P.Q. 603, 606 (T.T.A.B. 1974), aftd, 511 F.2d 1186 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
162. In In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961), the court stated:
[A]s to some. . .shapes the courts will never apply the "secondary meaning" doctrine so
as to create monopoly rights. The true basis of such holdings is not that they cannot or
do not indicate source to the purchasing public but that there is an overriding public
policy of preventing their monopolization, of preserving the public right to copy. A cer-
tain amount of purchaser confusion may even be tolerated in order to give the public the
advantages of free competition.
163. Black & Decker Mfg. v. Ever-Ready Appliance, 518 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Mo. 198 1), af'd,
684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973
(M.D. Tenn. 1971), af'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972).
164. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1981);
Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D. Hawaii 1979), aft'd, 652 F.2d 62 (9th
Cir. 1981); Oxford Pendafiex Corp. v. Rolodex Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. 249, 256 (T.T.A.B. 1979). A
feature which gives the consumer a substantial reason for purchasing the product as opposed
merely to distinguishing it from other products is functional. Price Food Co. v. Good Foods, Inc.,
400 F.2d 662, 665 (6th Cir. 1968).
165. Id. Functional features are features "which constitute the actual benefit that the con-
sumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, spon-
sored, or endorsed a product." Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
166. West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 591 (6th Cir. 1955); In re
Days-Ease Home Products Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 566, 567-68 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
167. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971);
In re Certain Steel Toy Vehicles, 197 U.S.P.Q. 873, 887 (I.T.C. 1978). "[Tihe case for functionality
thus depends on the evidence proffered by defendants that copying. . .served a number of utilita-
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ment of Torts, is "whether prohibition of imitation by others will de-
prive the others of something which will substantially hinder them in
competition."
68
The courts, unfortunately, have not been consistent in defining
either the scope or basic purposes of functionality. 169 Some courts, fol-
lowing the Restatement, have expanded the functionality concept to
include any feature that is considered to be an important ingredient in
the commercial success of the product, 170 while defining as nonfunc-
tional those traits unrelated to the basic consumer demands in connec-
tion with the product.'
7 '
The Restatement of Torts definition of functionality is very
broad.' 72 It includes aspects of configurations which operate only to
make them attractive and more marketable, thereby permitting exten-
sive simulation. The comment to section 742 makes it clear that func-
tionality depends on whether the feature affects or contributes to the
efficiency of the product or the ease or economy of its manufacture or
rian purposes. .. essential to effective competition." Ives Labs, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d
631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979).
168. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, comment a (1938). The Council of the American Law
Institute in compiling the second edition to the Restatement of Torts formally decided that §§ 708
through 761 of the original edition should no longer be included, concluding that if, in the future,
a Restatement of the subjects contained therein should be prepared, such subjects would be better
provided for in a separate publication. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory
Note, pp. 1-3.
169. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 484 (D. Neb. 1981). "The question
whether a configuration of a product or device is essentially functional or utilitarian is not an easy
one." In re Honeywell, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. 576, 578 (T.T.A.B. 1975), afTd, 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A.
1976); In re Weber-Stephen Products Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 509, 511 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
170. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); Pagliero v.
Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F.
Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
171. Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Kan. 1977); Application of
World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
172. An explanation of "functional" is found in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, comment (a)
(1938) which states:
A feature of goods, or of their wrappers or containers, may be functional because it
contributes to efficiency or economy in manufacturing them or in handling them through
the marketing process. It may be functional, also, because it contributes to their utility,
to their durability or to the effectiveness or ease with which they serve their function or
are handled by users. When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their
features may be functional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus aid
the performance of an object for which the goods are intended. Thus, the shape of a
bottle or other container may be functional though a different bottle or container may
hold the goods equally well. A candy box in the shape of a heart may be functional,
because of its significance as a gift to a beloved one, while a box of a different shape or
the form in which a ribbon is tied around the box may not be functional. Or a distinctive
printing type face may be functional though the print from a different type may be read
equally well. The determination of whether or not such features are functional depends
upon the question of fact whether prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the
others of something which will substantially hinder them in competition.
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marketing. It does not require the defendant to establish that the fea-
ture was essential. 73 This relieves the imitator of the burden of dem-
onstrating that imitation of the feature was, in some way, essential. It
implies that the availability of substitutes for the simulated feature is
basically irrelevant.
1 74
It appears that the Restatement's drafters intended the definition
to include aspects of goods which operate only to make the goods at-
tractive and therefore marketable. A feature which gives the consumer
a substantial reason for purchasing the product as opposed to merely
distinguishing it from other products is considered functional. 75  By
contrast, if a feature serves primarily to identify a product and does not
contribute substantially to the product's value, as determined by con-
sumers, it is nonfunctional and may not be copied.
176
The broader scope of aesthetic functionality, which in turn permits
the widest imitation, is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. 177 In Pagliero, the court permitted the
defendant to copy the designs originated by the plaintiff for its hotel
china.17 8 The plaintiff brought an unfair competition action under the
Lanham Act, alleging that the defendant had copied the designs alleg-
edly created and used by the plaintiff in its various lines of china. 179
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against the use by a
competitor of a name and design similar to that employed on the plain-
tiff's hotel china.'8 0 Plaintiff claimed that the designs had become so
associated in the minds of the public with plaintiff's business that com-
mon law trademark rights were established through secondary mean-
ing. 18! The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enjoin imitation
of the pattern, holding that the decorative features of china were very
closely related to its saleability and were therefore functional. 
82
173. Id. The fact that a configuration or device may be produced in other forms or shapes
does not necessarily detract from the functional nature of the configuration. Pagliero v. Wallace
China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1952); In re Honeywell, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. 576, 579
(T.T.A.B. 1975), afj'd, 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
174. See supra note 172.
175. In re Ovation Instruments, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 116, 123 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
176. Id. See also Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
and In re Days-Ease Home Products Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 566, 568 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
177. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). For a recent discussion of aesthetic functionality, see Duff,
Aesthetic Functionality, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 151 (1983) and Note, The Broad Sweep ofAesthetic
Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 FORDHAM L.
REV. 345 (1982).
178. Id. at 344.
179. Id. at 340.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 343-44.
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The court assumed the presence of secondary meaning and stated
the well-established rule that protection against copying will not be ex-
tended to "functional" features, i.e., features which serve other than a
trademark purpose and are important ingredients in the commercial
success of the product. 8 3 The aesthetically pleasing designs were held
to be an important selling feature of the china and not adopted solely
to indicate origin of manufacture. 184 Since the defendant included its
name as manufacturer on the underside of all its china, the court found
no likelihood of confusion and permitted the defendant to continue us-
ing the designs. 18 5
The difficulty with accepting such a broad view of functionality is
that it provides a disincentive for development of imaginative and at-
tractive designs. The inquiry should instead focus on the extent to
which the design feature is related to the utilitarian function of the
product. 18 6 When the design itself (including its package or container)
is not significantly related to the utilitarian functions of the product,
but is merely distinctive or arbitrary, then it is entitled to protection as
a trademark if it is arbitrary in shape or has acquired the necessary
secondary meaning. 18
7
Only recently has the concept of functionality been placed in a
proper prospective by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In
re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc.188 There, the applicant sought to
register a container shape as a trademark for spray starch and similar
products. 189 The Patent and Trademark Office examiner denied regis-
tration, finding the container to be "merely functional," "essentially
utilitarian" and "non-arbitrary."' 90 The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board agreed. 19'
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, finding that
the container shape was not barred from registration by reason of the
functionality doctrine and remanded the case for further consideration
183. Id. at 343.
184. The court went so far as to say "[Tlhe possibility that an alternative product might be
developed has never been considered a barrier to permitting imitation . I. " d. at 344.
185. Id. at 344.
186. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1981).
187. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently may have retreated from its holding in
Pagliero. In Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981), the court
disapproved the district court's holding that "any feature of a product which contributes to the
consumer appeal and saleability of the product is, as a matter of law, a functional element of that
product." Id. at 773.
188. 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
189. Id. at 1334.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1335.
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of the secondary meaning issue. 192 The court pointed out that many
trial and appellate courts have failed to define the scope of functional-
ity, merely concluding that if a configuration is "functional" it is not
protectable and if it is "non-functional," it may be protected.
93
The court properly focused on functionality as an element of com-
petition. 94 The broad definition of the Restatement (and the oft-cited
Pagliero case) utilizing the terms "affects" and "contributes" was con-
sidered to be so broad as to be meaningless'" because every design
"affects" or "contributes to" the utility of the article in which it is em-
bodied.196 The correct inquiry is whether preventing competitors from
copying the package will hinder effective competition. 97 Citing the
Lanham Act definition that a trademark is "any word, name, symbol,
or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufac-
turer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others,'198 the court concluded that a
container design could function as a trademark, so long as it was not
functional and identified its manufacturer or seller. 199
Functionality, according to the Morton-Norwich court, relates to
the design of the thing being considered, that is, its appearance and not
the thing itself.2°° The degree of a design's utility, and not the mere
existence of a utilitarian design, is the issue.20' Thus, the question is
not whether the individual parts of a package are essential but whether
the design of the whole assembly of those parts is essential.
20 2
A court must consider the degree of the design's utility.20 3 A shape
is protectable unless the particular design is essential to its use.20 4 Pre-
vious courts had viewed this problem as one involving the need to copy
192. Id. at 1344.
193. Id. at 1337.
194. Id. at 1339.
195. Id. at 1340.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1341.
198. Id. at 1336.
199. Id. at 1343.
200. There is a distinction between "'de facto" functionality and legal or "de jure" functional-
ity. The former is protectable but the latter is not. Id. at 1337. De facto functionality indicates
that although the design of a container, or any of its features is directed at the performances of a
function, it may be legally recognized as a designation of origin. De jure functionality indicates
the design cannot be protected. Id. For example, in Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp.
1231 (D. Kan. 1977), the roof of plaintiffs photo-center was considered de facto functional. It
does protect people and the building's contents from the weather. This alone, however, does not
mean the roof is considered functional in the legal, or de jure, sense.





in order to compete effectively in the market place. Stated another
way, will prohibiting copying hinder the competitor in competition?205
Is the shape the best or one of a few superior designs available?206
Most designs are utilitarian to some extent. 207 This, in and of it-
self, will not bar registration. 20 8 The fact that a container is highly use-
ful and performs its intended functions well, does not render the shape
functional.209 When the exact same functions may be performed by
many other shapes there can be no functional advantage in the
shape. 210 It is not enough to say that the container design must be ac-
commodated to the functions performed. The design must be dictated
by them to be considered functional. 21' As the Morton-Norwich court
pointed out:
[A] molded plastic bottle can have an infinite variety of forms or
designs and still [function] to hold liquid. No one form is necessary
or appears to be 'superior.' ***[Tlhe same functions can be per-
formed by a variety of other shapes with no sacrifice of any func-
tional advantage. There is no necessity to copy appellant's trade
dress to enjoy any of the functions of a spray-top container.
212
The question whether a package configuration is essentially func-
tional or utilitarian is generally not an easy one to resolve. The guide-
lines set forth in Morton-Norwich provide a stepping stone for the
courts to review this principle in a more objective manner. Container
and package designs, as opposed to product configurations, are usually
not dictated by the functional requirements of the product. They can
be more easily arbitrary and ornamental. Thus, when seeking registra-
tion or relief in court, the owner of a container or package (as opposed
to a product) should be more readily able to establish the shape as non-
functional. This, however, will not be enough to obtain protection for
the configuration. There is another element one must establish-secon-
dary meaning.
Secondary Meaning
Secondary meaning,213 the additional requirement for trademark
205. Id. at 1339.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1338.
208. Id. at 1341-42.
209. Id. at 1342.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (emphasis in original).
213. The term "Secondary Meaning" is somewhat of a misnomer. The plaintiff must actually
prove that the primary meaning of the symbol is that the product comes from a particular source.
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protection, simply means buyer association. 214 To establish secondary
meaning the owner of the trademark must show that the package or
container design identifies the source of the article in the consumer's
mind and that purchasers are moved to buy it because of its source.
215
However, the fact that two competitors use similar or even identi-
cal packaging for their respective products, and that the purchasing
public is likely to be confused as a result, does not alone establish that
one company's package has obtained secondary meaning. 216  If the
buyer class is indifferent at the outset, and fails to associate a package
shape with a company's product, the law will not afford protection, no
matter how closely or deliberately it is imitated by another.21 7 Thus, if
the company can not establish secondary meaning, a competitor's imi-
tation of the package will not lead to the public's misidentification of its
source. 21 8 The point of inquiry is whether the relevant public under-
Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 904 (D.R.I. 1980), rev'don other
grounds, 655 F.2d 5 (ist Cir. 1981).
214. Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); John
Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 317-18 (E.D. Pa. 1976), af'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part sub nomine, Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978).
215. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liq-
uid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978); Superior Models, Inc. v. Tolkien Enterprises,
211 U.S.P.Q. 587, 590 (D. Del.), modoed, 211 U.S.P.Q. 876 (D. Del. 1981).
As recently defined by the Second Circuit in American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear
Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980):
The doctrine of secondary meaning requires not only that the mark have a subordinate
meaning, but also that the primary significance of the mark in the minds of the consum-
ers is the identification of the producer, not a designation of the product. . . . The
crucial question. . .always is whether the public is moved in any degree to buy an article
because of its source. . . . Each case must. . .be decided on its facts with consideration
given to such elements as the length and exclusivity of use, sales levels, and extent of
advertising and promotion.
216. Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Filter Dynam-
ics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery Inc., 19 111. App. 3d 299, 311, 311 N.E.2d 386, 396 (1974); Fashion
Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 847-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Mark Charcoal Co.,
Inc. v. Almarc Mfg. Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. 1076, 1078 (N.D. III. 1981). As stated in Beneficial Corp. v.
Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y., 1982):
[Tihe trademark laws do not protect against the possibility that a member of the general
public might fall under the mistaken impression that the companies are related. Rather,
the trademark laws are intended to protect those members of the public who are or may
become customers of either from purchasing the products of one of them under the mis-
taken assumption that they are buying a product produced or sponsored by the other.
217. Ives Labs, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 394, 401 (E.D.N.Y.), overruled on
other grounds., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'dsub nomine, Inwood Labs. v. Ives Lab., 454 U.S.
1120 (1982).
"The crucial question in a case involving 'secondary meaning' always is whether the public is
moved in any degree to buy an article because of its source." American Footwear Corp. v. Gen-
eral Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980). See also
Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc. v. Zeeman Mfg. Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1978); John
Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afi'd in part, rev'd and re-
manded in part sub nomine, Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978).
218. Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 353 F.2d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 1965). As
stated by MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 15:16:
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stands the mark as a designation of a particular origin. 219 This may be
an anonymous producer, since consumers often buy goods without
knowing the personal identity or actual name of the manufacturer. 220
The primary significance of the mark in the minds of the consumers
must be the identification of the producer and not a designation of the
product itself.
22'
Secondary meaning is often difficult to establish. 222 No precise
The important evidentiary point to be kept in mind is that evidence of the seller's efforts
to achieve buyer association and secondary meaning is merely circumstantial evidence
from which the ultimate factual conclusion may be inferred. The crux of the matter is
whether the seller's efforts have borne fruit in the minds of a substantial number of
buyers-do they, in fact, associate (the plaintiff's product] with a single source? (Empha-
sis in original).
219. Loctite Corp. v. National Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
As stated by the court in Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133
F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1943):
To acquire a secondary meaning in the minds of the buying public, an article of mer-
chandise when shown to a prospective customer must prompt the affirmation, "That is
the article I want because I know its source," and not the negative inquiry as to "Who
makes that article?" In other words, the article must proclaim its identification with its
source, and not simply stimulate inquiry about it.
220. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982);
Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 353 F.2d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 1965); Ralston Purina
Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
221. American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); Int'l Election Systems Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684, 711
(E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979).
Recently, it appeared that the federal district court in the Southern District of New York had
accepted the argument that a plaintiff is entitled to protection if he can establish secondary mean-
ing "in the making" even though secondary meaning has not yet attached to his mark. For exam-
ple, the court granted protection in Orion Pictures Co. v. Dell Publishing Co., 471 Supp. 392
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). There, the pre-released publicity of a film not yet released was extensive and
amply demonstrated. The court found that although secondary meaning, as such, did not exist
because the film was not yet on the market, defendant's scheme for its own promotional literature,
advertising and marketing, "was counting on the plaintiff's publicity as the primary means by
which to promote" the defendant's product. Id. at 396. In National Lampoon, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir.
1974), the district court said:
Strong evidence of secondary meaning has been presented by plaintiff. . . .fe]ven as-
suming secondary meaning has not yet come to full fruition, "A mark with secondary
meaning in the making should also be protected, at least against those who appropriate it
with knowledge or good reason to know of its potential in that regard, or with an intent
to capitalize on its quality. 'Piracy should no more be tolerated in the earlier stages of
development of quality than in the later.'" 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS AND MONOPOLIES 356 (3d ed. 1971).
376 F. Supp. at 747.
However, a later case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Perfect Fit Industries, Inc. v.
Acme Quality Co., 484 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 618 F.2d 950
(2d Cir. 1980)) and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Black & Decker Mfg. v. Ever-Ready
Appliance, 518 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aftd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982)) have rejected
this theory. See Scagnelli, Dawn of a New Doctrine?-Trademark Protection for Incipient Secon-
dary Meaning, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 527 (1981).
222. Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1981). See In re
Mogen David Wine Corp., 55 T.M.R. 310 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aft'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967);
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guidelines are available and no single factor is determinative. 223 Each
case must be decided on its own facts. Secondary meaning is generally
proven through extensive advertising, 224 distribution availability, 225
sales volume,226 length and manner of use, 227 and market share,228
which create in the minds of the consumers an association between dif-
ferent products bearing the same mark.229 This association suggests
that the products originate from a single source. These elements are all
evidence of a party's intent to establish secondary meaning but are cer-
tainly not conclusive. 2
30
Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 308, 311 N.E.2d 386, 393-94
(1974).
223. Parrot Jungle, Inc. v. Parrot Jungle, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 266, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Ralston
Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
224. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cit.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1123 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (advertising campaign may create a subliminal association in the minds of consumers). Al-
though the amount spent on advertising is a factor to be considered in determining whether secon-
dary meaning is proven, it is not conclusive. "The critical question...is not the extent of the
promotional efforts but their effectiveness in creating an association between the. . . design and
[plaintiffs products]." Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.
Fla. 1981), afl'd, 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). See St. Ives Labs v. Na-
ture's Own Labs, 529 F. Supp. 347, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Boehringer Ingelheim v. Pharmadyne
Lab., 532 F. Supp. 1040, 1063 (D.N.J. 1980); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F.
Supp. 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Fremont Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 415,
421 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
225. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. 545, 546-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Frawley Corp. v. Penmaster Co., 131 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Il. 1954).
226. Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Car-
olina Enterprises, Inc. v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 479, 482 (D.N.J. 1981); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 55 T.M.R. 310, 313 (T.T.A.B. 1965), afld, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
Sales per se, however, have no more evidentiary value than do sales figures, per se. The issue
is not whether applicant's product is popular but rather whether the purchasing public recognizes
the configuration of the container in which it is sold as an indication of source or origin. In re
Semel, 189 U.S.P.Q. 285, 288 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
227. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
228. A. H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
229. American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 660-61 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 78
(S.D. Fla. 1981), afd, 716 F.2d 854 (11 th Cir. 1983). Survey evidence is often considered very
important in establishing secondary meaning. See, e.g., Superior Models, Inc. v. Tolkien Enter-
prises, 211 U.S.P.Q. 587, 591 (D. Del.), modofed, 211 U.S.P.Q. 876 (D. Del. 1981).
230. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976); Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D. Fla. 1981), af'd, 716
F.2d 854 (11 th Cir. 1983); MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 15:16.
Availability, sales, market share and advertising do not exist in a vacuum, but in the context
of their effect on the relevant purchasing public. Black & Decker Mfg. v. Ever-Ready Appliance,
518 F. Supp. 607, 612 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aftd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982); Loctite Corp. v. Na-
tional Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See also Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc. v. Zeeman Mfg. Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. 585, 590 (N.D. Ga.
1978) ("Plaintiff may have invested a great deal of money in advertising the suit and in pointing
out its supposedly distinctive design features, but much more is required to establish secondary
meaning"); In re Semel, 189 U.S.P.Q. 285, 287 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (substantial advertising of cylin-
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Once an applicant can establish the non-functionality and secon-
dary meaning (or distinctiveness) of his container or package configur-
ation, he will be entitled to register it on the principal register,23' and
receive all the statutory benefits therefrom.2 32 If he can prove only that
the shape is non-functional and capable of becoming distinctive, then
supplemental registration is in order.
233
Normally, however, companies do not display their goods in bare
containers or packages without other source indicia. 234 While it is
often difficult to establish a secondary meaning to the contour of a
container or package, 235 there are shapes and forms of containers and
packages which are so unique or distinctive that through long utiliza-
tion, they do become associated with a particular product.
236
B. Section 43(a) of The Lanham Act
Although packaging can be registered on the federal register as a
trademark, many businesses do not register container or package
shapes,237 relying instead on Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to obtain
redress from infringement. 238 Section 43(a) 239 creates a distinct federal
drical package of fireworks insufficient); Le Cordon Bleu v. Littlefield, 518 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (wherein plaintiff failed to establish secondary meaning in the name "Cordon Bleu" for its
cooking school).
231. Application of World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Ova-
tion Instruments, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 116 (T.T.A.B. 1978); In re Days-Ease Home Prod. Corp., 197
U.S.P.Q. 566 (T.T.A.B. 1977); In re Fre-Mar Indus., Inc., 158 U.S.P.Q. 364 (T.T.A.B. 1968); Ex
parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r Pats. 1958).
232. See supra notes 124 through 129.
233. See supra notes 134 through 140.
234. See, e.g., Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980); Johnson &
Johnson v. Quality Pure, 207 U.S.P.Q. 1127 (D.N.J. 1979); Application of Mogen David Wine
Corp., 55 T.M.R. 310 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aft'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
235. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 55 T.M.R. 310 (T.T.A.B. 1965), aft'd, 372 F.2d
539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Price Food Co. v. Good Foods, Inc., 400 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1968) (translucent
plastic container for cheese); Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 II. App. 3d 299,
311 N.E.2d 386 (1974) (display package for automotive batteries).
236. In re Days-Ease Home Prod. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 566 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (liquid chemical
drain open container); Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r Pats. 1958) (scotch
whiskey bottle). But see Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 55 T.M.R. 310 (T.T.A.B.
1965), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
237. One need only look at the difficulty encountered by Mogen David Wine Corp. in attempt-
ing to register what many people felt was its distinctively known wine decanter. See In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 55 T.M.R. 310 (T.T.A.B. 1965), afl'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967), wherein
Mogen David failed to convince the court that its wine bottle configuration acquired the necessary
secondary meaning. See also In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
238. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into coin-
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statutory tort of unfair competition designed to afford broad protection
by providing a remedy to a party aggrieved by another's "false designa-
tion of origin" of his product, 240 even though he does not have a feder-
ally registered trademark.24' The essence of a claim under § 43(a) is
that a competitor's packaging or labelling deceives purchasers as to the
source of its goods; i.e., that consumers buy the competitor's product
merce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of
origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or
used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be
liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as
that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who
believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
239. There has been a significant amount of commentary on this section, including Note, The
Problem of Functional Features. Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 77 (1982); Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. You've Come a Long Way, Baby--Too Far, Maybe?, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 193 (1973); Note,
Trademark Infringement-Lanham Act § 43(a)-Source Confusion, 48 TENN. L. REV. 182 (1980);
Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act-A Federal Unfair Competition Remedy, 25 DRAKE L. REV.
228 (1975); Note, The Lanham Trademark Act, Section 43(a)-A Hidden National Law of Unfair
Competition, 14 WASHBURN L. J. 330 (1975); Comment, Analysis of a Statutory Violation of the
Lanham Act § 43(a), 29 MERCER L. REV. 1083 (1978); Comment, The Present Scope of Recovery
for Unfair Competition 14olations Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 58 NEB. L. REV. 159
(1978).
240. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 115, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 324-25 (E.D. Pa. 1976), a j'din par rev'dand
remanded in part sub nomine, Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); Franklin
Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
The court in L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954),
stated:
We find nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view that this
section is merely declarative of existing law. . .. It seems to us that Congress has defined
a statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in commerce and has given a
broad class of suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in
the federal courts. This statutory tort is defined in language which differentiates it in
some particulars from similar wrongs which have developed and have become defined in
the judge made law of unfair competition.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently rejected prior case law holding that the
use of a confusingly similar trade dress (including container shape) constitutes a "false designation
of origin" in Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.
198 1). The court held the "false representation" language of § 43(a) was more appropriate to such
actions. This provision applies not only to false advertising by making false affirmative represen-
tations regarding one's own product (as opposed to disparaging another's product) but also to
unfair competition such as trade dress infringement. Id. at 702. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982), held that the false designation of origin provision of § 43(a) does
apply to trade dress confusion. No other circuit to date has followed the holding in Chevron
Chemical Co. See also Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d
642, 647 n.3 (6th Cir. 1982).
241. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76-77, 78 (2d Cir. 1981); Bose Corp. v.
Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1972); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe
Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D. Fla. 1981); McTavish Bob Oil Co. v. Disco Oil Co., 345 F. Supp.
1379, 1381 (N.D. Ill. 1972); F.E.L. Publications v. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 466
F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (N.D. I11. 1978).
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thinking it to be that of the plaintiff.242 The factors relevant to this
inquiry are essentially the same as those relevant in determining trade-
mark infringement (secondary meaning and non-functionality), 243 but
242. Sun-Fun Product, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development, Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th
Cir. 1981); Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1956); Source
Perrier, S.A. v. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 617, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
On its face, Section 43(a) gives standing to sue to "any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged." L'Aiglon Apparel Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650 (3d Cir.
1954). The word "person" in this section includes "juristic persons" (e.g., firms, corporations,
unions and associations as well as "natural persons"), 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Nor must the plaintiff be
in actual competition with the alleged wrongdoer. F.E.L. Publications Ltd. v. National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has ruled, however, that this Section does not give standing to consumers. Colligan v.
Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 687 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971).
243. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir.
1982); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1981); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 484-85 (D. Neb. 1981); Howw Mfg., Inc. v. Formac,
Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 793, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1981). However, the Second Circuit (Perfect Fit Industries,
Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 952-54 (2d Cir. 1980); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexi-
tized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1964), ceri. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965)) and Ninth Circuit
(Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1960)) have held
that secondary meaning is established merely by proving that the defendant has copied plaintiffs
configuration. This rule was articulated by then Judge Learned Hand in American Chickle Co. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1953):
[Ilt is generally true that, as soon as we see that a second comer in a market has, for
no reason that he can assign, plagiarized the "make-up" of an earlier comer, we need no
more; for he at any rate thinks that any differential he adds will not, or at least may not,
prevent the [inferentially intentional] diversion and we are content to accept his forecast
that he is "likely" to succeed. Then we feel bound to compel him to exercise his ingenu-
ity in quarters further afield.
The court stated in Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781-82 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965):
[RIelief has been granted in New York in a wide variety of situations to insure that
"one may not misappropriate the results of the skill, expenditures and labors of a com-
petitor"....A doctrine particularly developed in New York is that of granting relief
upon the theory of the misappropriation of a property right or a commercial advantage
of another. . .. Particularly where the defendant's conduct has involved a clear attempt
to profit at the expense of plaintiff,. . .New York courts have deemed the conduct to be
unfair competition despite the fact that plaintiffs mark has not acquired a secondary
meaning.
As stated in Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910), "It is so easy for
the honest business man, who wishes to sell his goods upon their merits, to select marks and
packagings that cannot possibly be confused with his competitor's that courts look with suspicion
upon one who, in dressing his goods for the market, approaches so near his successful rival that
the public may fail to distinguish between them."
The Fifth Circuit has also supported this proposition. In Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980), the court stated: "[lIntent of
defendants in adopting [its mark] is a critical factor, since if the mark was adopted with the intent
of deriving benefit from the reputation of [the plaintiff] that fact alone 'may be sufficient to justify
the inference that there is confusing similarity'." Secondary meaning is not necessary if the pack-
age or container configuration is arbitrary or distinctive. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981).
However, even in New York relief based solely on intentional copying is not unlimited. In E.
R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper Labs, 536 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court stated that
prior knowledge of plaintiffs mark alone will not be grounds for relief when the mark is not
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the scope of inquiry into similarity of design is considerably broader.244
Section 43(a) is meant to protect the public from confusion as to
the source of goods being purchased.245  Secondary meaning becomes
important in the protection of containers and packages under this stat-
utory provision,246 because without it, no inference of deception ex-
ists.247 Consumer confusion of two products is not proof that the
arbitrary or suggestive. There may be many legitimate reasons for copying a descriptive mark
other than to confuse the purchasing public as to source.
The applicability of a defendant's intent was placed in proper prospective in Brooks Shoe
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75 (S.D. Fla. 1981), afd, 716 F.2d 854 (1Ilth Cir.
1983). There, the court stated that intent is only one factor to be considered in establishing secon-
dary meaning. The Second Circuit ignores the requirement that in order to obtain trademark
protection, a plaintiff must establish that its mark is associated by the public with one source. To
this effect the court stated:
By contending that secondary meaning should be implied when intent to copj, is proven,
Plaintiff is asking this Court to find a violation of section 43(a) solely on the basis of
Defendant's intent without requiring proof of secondary meaning or likelihood of confu-
sion. This approach could result in the imposition of liability based on Defendant's
subjective intent instead of an objective determination that there is a likelihood that the
public would be confused. The Court feels that such an approach would be improper
because section 43(a) was designed to protect the public from deceptive trade practices,
not to punish persons who copy a mark or a name, and the requirement of proving
secondary meaning insures that liability will only be imposed when the trade practice at
issue is truly deceiving.
533 F. Supp. at 82 n.14 (Emphasis in original).
See also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831-32 (1 Ith
Cir. 1982). "The defendant's intent to tread on the goodwill of the plaintiff, while certainly a
relevant factor in establishing a likelihood of confusion. . .is not the only factor." (Citation
omitted).
244. American Rice v. Arkansas Rice Growers Co-Op., 532 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Tex. 1982);
Vetter, Inc. v. Paratech, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 478, 479 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
245. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 518 F. Supp. 607, 616 (E.D.
Mo. 1981), af'd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982). The purpose and import of§ 43(a) is set forth in
Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), aj7'dsub nom., S.C. Johnson & Son
v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956):
It means that wrongful diversion of trade resulting from false description of one's prod-
ucts invades that interest which an honest competitor has in fair business dealings-an
interest which the courts should and will protect. ... It represents, within this area, an
affirmative code of business ethics whose standards can be maintained by anyone who is
or may be damaged by a violation of this segment of the code. In effect it says: you may
not conduct your business in a way that unnecessarily or unfairly interferes with and
injures that of another; you may not destroy the basis of genuine competition by destroy-
ing the buyer's opportunity to judge fairly between rival commodities by introducing
such factors as falsely descriptive trade-marks which are capable of misinforming as to
the true qualities of the competitive products.
246. Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 1981), cerl.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d
Cir. 1956). The plaintiff must establish that it acquired secondary meaning in its configuration
prior to the date the defendant began using a similar configuration. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v.
Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
247. Otherwise, there would be no "false designation of origin." The public must know a
particular configuration indicates a particular source of origin before there can be any deception.
Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass. Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 697 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
Proof of confusion, by itself, is not sufficient to support a § 43(a) claim for false designation of
origin when the product is not registered. Plaintiff must establish secondary meaning (see .upra
notes 168 through 187). 15 U.S.C. § 1114, which provides the principal remedy for violation of a
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consumers associated its package or container with a particular source.
A competitor may desire to copy a container shape merely because he
finds it attractive; and if the shape is not associated with any particular
source, the consuming public will assume it is simply a typical package
or container used in the industry and will not make assumptions as to
its sources.
248
When the packaging of a product has attained a secondary mean-
ing, the purchasing public associates that package with the producer of
the product, not just with the product itself.249  If a competitor then
copies that package, the public is likely to believe that the competitor's
product is also produced by the original producer. 250  Under such cir-
cumstances the plaintiff can establish a false designation of origin
within the meaning of the statute.
The additional requirement of 43(a) is that the copied features be
nonfunctional. This requirement limits protection to unique or distinc-
tive identifying features of an object,25 1 and is indicative of a concern
that first-comers not be allowed to prevent the widespread use of useful
but nonpatentable features.
252
Section 43(a) does not require the showing that anyone has actu-
registered mark, permits recovery when copying "is likely to cause confusion." Section 43(a),
however, does not use the language "likely to cause confusion." The reason for this difference is
that a registered mark is presumed to represent the source of origin in the minds of the purchasing
public while unregistered marks do not. Plaintiff must prove secondary meaning. John Deere and
Co. v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 681 F.2d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 1982); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body
Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 304 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982). See Vuitton et
Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff's handbag
design was registered on the Principal Register and the court thus assumed the mark was intended
to indicate the product's origin. The burden thus shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption
of plaintiffs right to such protected use). Waples-Platter Companies v. Gen. Foods Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 551, 574 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
248. In Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 235 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Ill. 1964), ajj'd,
353 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1965), the defendant sold a candy sucker in packaging and shape almost
identical to plaintiff's. In fact, the defendant admitted that he tried "to get as close to (plaintiff) as
I thought good ethics and good taste would allow me to." 353 F.2d at 643. Without proof of
secondary meaning, however, the court refused to grant relief. See also Keebler Co. v. Rovira
Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980) (cylindrical cans for soda crackers) and Brooks Shoe
Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 93 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
249. See supra notes 213-36.
250. "The question is what is the likely ultimate impression, upon customers and potential
customers of the relevant. . . products which will be created by what is said and what is reason-
ably implied." Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp. 366, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (emphasis by court).
251. Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
252. Id See also Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 518 F. Supp.
607 (E.D. Mo. 1981), afrd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982).
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ally been deceived. 253 The courts have interpreted the statute as apply-
ing to situations where the misleading designation has a tendency to
deceive, or is likely to cause confusion. 254 A right to relief exists, how-
ever, only if the total impression of the package, including its size,
shape, color and design, upon the customer will be likely to cause him
to confuse the origin of the product. 255
C Common Law Unfair Competition
Trademark protection is based on whether a certain symbol actu-
ally functions as an indicia of source and whether the defendant's sym-
bol is likely to cause confusion. 256 Unfair competition law is much
broader.25 7 It encompasses misappropriation of the skill, expenditures
and labor of another.258 There, the issue revolves around the total sell-
ing image of plaintiff's product, package and advertising.259 The rele-
vant inquiry is whether the parties' product's overall impression is
253. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp. 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
254. Id. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831 (1lth Cir.
1982).
255. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir.
1981) (color); Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development, Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192
(5th Cir. 1981); A. H. Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1020-21 (E.D. Mo.
1980) (the size, shape and color of plaintiffs prescription drug capsules acquired secondary mean-
ing); Fremont Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (the
overall appearance of the challenged packaging must be considered); Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v.
A & A Fiberglass Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 697 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Ives Labs, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.,
488 F. Supp. 394, 399 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub
nom. Inwood Labs v. Ives Labs, 454 U.S. 1120 (1982) (The remedial nature of § 43(a) is more
extensive in the sense that it will. . .safeguard brand identification devices).
256. See supra notes 106 through 116.
257. Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 839 (1965). The essence of unfair competition is the sale of one's own goods for those of
another person. Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 461 (1911). The
purposes of unfair competition are three-fold: "first to protect the honest trader in his business;
second, to punish the dishonest trader who diverts his competitor's business by unfair means; and
third, to protect the public from deception." 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-MARK
AND MONOPOLIES § 34, at 32 (1967).
Traditionally, trademark infringement is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition,
the general purpose of which is to prevent one person from passing off his goods or his business as
the goods or business of another. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-14
(1916). Unfair competition involves any violation of a right arising from the operation of an
established business. The focus, generally, is on the buyer's likely confusion between two prod-
ucts based on an examination of everything that is likely to have an impact upon the purchaser.
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, at § 2:2. "The essence of... unfair competition is fair play." Time
Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 915 (D.N.J. 1976).
258. American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980).
259. Waples-Platter Co. v. General Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 575 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
Scholl, Inc. v. Tops E.H.R. Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q. 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Filter Dynamics Int'l Inc. v.
Astron Battery Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 312, 311 N.E.2d 386, 397 (1974); Mars, Inc. v. Curtiss
Candy Co., 8 I11. App. 3d 338, 343, 290 N.E.2d 701, 703-04 (1972). See supra note 237.
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likely to cause confusion.26° If so, then a finding of unfair competition
is justified.26 1 The elements a court must consider are broad. Anything
which the ordinary purchaser sees, including the size, shape, color(s), of
a package or its label is included.262 Once the first user can establish a
likelihood of confusion between its products and another's, relief will
be justified.
CONCLUSION
Packaging continues to play a significant role in successfully mar-
keting products to the public. Large amounts of time, money and effort
are expended to distinguish one's product from another. There are var-
ious methods whereby a company can protect its packaging once it es-
tablishes that it is distinctive (or has acquired a secondary meaning)
and is nonfunctional. It is essential that each be kept in mind when
designing a package shape. All too often, one finds too late that its
configuration is not protectable and all the energy used to develop it
can be appropriated by a competitor with little or no sanctions avail-
able to remedy the situation.
260. Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distributors, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 471, 478 (D.P.R. 1981), affd, 687
F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982); Mars, Inc. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 338, 343, 290 N.E.2d 701,
703-04 (1972).
It is often stated that the law of trademarks is only a part of the broader law of unfair compe-
tition. The distinction between trademark infringement and unfair competition has been stated in
Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), ar9'd, 312
F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963), as follows:
Trade-mark infringement rests on a relatively narrow principle compared to unfair com-
petition. The essential element of a trade-mark is the exclusive right of its owner to use a
word or device to distinguish his product. On the other hand, a claim of unfair competi-
tion considers the total physical image given by the product and its name together. Thus
unfair competition exists if the total impression of package, size, shape, color, design and
name upon the consumer will lead him to confuse the origin of the product.
The test under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)) or state law, (e.g., Illinois) is the same-a
likelihood of confusion. James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th
Cir. 1976). See also Clairol Inc. v. Cosway Co., Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 583 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
261. MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 8.1.
262. Id. at § 8.3.

